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IN TI-IE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
S H E R MAN CARTER, a Taxpayer, for himself and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
BEAVER COUNTY SERVICE
AREA NO. ONE, a body corporate and politic, et al,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
10136

BRIEF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for a declaratory judgment
wherein a taxpayer has challenged the constitutionality of the Service Area Act (Chapter 29, Title 17,
Utah Code Annotated).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court rejected plaintiff's arguments,
and sustained the act as constitutional.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Attorney General requests affirmance of
the judgment of the lower court, but urges that Ser'ice Areas be judicially limited to the performance
of essential governmental functions.
1
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STA'TE:MEN'T OF FACTS
The Attorney General accepts the statement of
facts as set forth in the briefs of appellant and
respondents.
AUTHORITY FOR APPEARANCE
The Attorney General did not appear in the
lower court, but has appeared on appeal by virtue of
the statutory authority granted in Section 78-33-11,
Utah Code Annotated (1953). The Attorney General
argues neither in support of appellant nor respondent, but in support of the public, and public agencies,
of the State of Utah.
ARGUMENT
COUNTY SERVICE AREAS ARE QUASIMUNICIPAL PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, PERF 0 R M I N G GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS
FOR THOSE SITUATED WITHIN THE AREA.
A. Service Areas do not violate constitutional
debt limitations.
Because of the serious significance of the questions related to debt limitations, it is deemed advisable to set forth all of Article XIV of the Constitution of Utah, consisting of Sections 1 through 7.
ARTICLE XIV - Public Debt
Section 1. To meet casual deficits or
failures in revenue, and for necessary expenditures for public purposes, including the
erection of public buildings, and for the payment of all Territorial indebtedness assumed
by the State, the 'State may contract debts, not
exceeding in the aggregate at any one time,
2
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an an1ount equal to one and one-half per centum of the value of the taxable property of
the State, as shown by the last assessment
for State purposes, previous to the incurring
of such indebtedness. But the State shall
never contract any indebtedness except as
in the next Section provided, in excess of
such amount, and all monies arising from
loans herein authorized, shall be applied
solely to the purposes for which they were
obtained. (As amended November 8, 1910.)
Section 2. The State m.ay contract debts
to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or to
defend the State in war, but the money arising from the contracting of such debts shall
be applied solely to the purpose for whi'ch it
was obtained.
Section 3. No debt in excess of the taxes for the current year shall be created by any
county or subdivision thereof, or by any school
district therein, or by any city, town or village, or any subdivision thereof in this State;
unless the proposition to create such debt,
shall have been submitted to a vote of such
qualified electors as shall have paid a property tax therein, in the year preceding such
election, and a majority of those voting
thereon shall have voted in favor of incurring such debt.
Section 4. When authorized to create
indebtedness as provided in Section 3 of this
Article, no county shall become indebted to
an amount, including existing indebtedness
exceeding two per centum. No city, town,
school district or other municipal corporation, shall become indebted to an amount, in3
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eluding existing indebtedness 1 exceeding four
per centum of the value of the taxable property therein, the value to be ascertained by
the last assessment for State and County purposes, previous to the incurring of such indebtedness; except that in incorporated cities
the assessment shall be taken from the last
assessment for city purposes; provided, that
no part of the indebtedness .allowed in this
section shall be incurred for other than strictly county, city, town or school district pur·
poses; provided further, that any city of the
first :and second c1lass when authorized as pro~
vided in Section three of this article, m:ay be allowed to irrcur a larger indebtedne'ss, not t0
exceed four per centum and any city of the
third class, or town, not to exceed eight per
centum additional, for supplying such city or
town with water, artificial lights or sewers,
when the works for supplying such water,
light and sewers, shall be owned and controlled
by the municipality. (As amended November
8, 1910.)
Section 5. All monies borrowed by, or
on behalf of the State or any legal subdivision thereof, shall be used solely for the purpose specified in the law authorizing the loan.
Section 6. The State shall not assume
the debt, or any part thereof, of any county,
city, town or school district.
Section 7. Nothing in this article shall
be so construed as to impair or add to the
obligation of any debt heretofore contracted,
in accordance with the laws of Utah Territory, by any county, city, town or school district, or to prevent the contracting of any
4
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debt, or the issuing of bonds therefor, in accordance with said laws, upon any proposition
for that purpose, which, according to said
laws, may have been submitted to a vote of
the qualified electors of any county, city, town
or school district before the day on which this
Constitution takes effect.
It is obvious that the framers of the Constitution were concerned with the debt limitations of the
State and subordinate levels of governn1ent. Section
1 of Article XIV initially placed a debt limit upon
the State of $200,000 over and above the territorial
indebtedness which was assumed by the State. In
1910 the section was amended to increase the limit
to permit the State to contract debts not exceeding
in the aggregate at any one time an amount equal
to one and one-half per centum of the value of the
taxable property of the State. This appears to be
an all inclusive limitation which would be a limit
against any and all contracted indebtedness of the
State of Utah, at least so far as such indebtedness
is to be paid from tax revenues. This Court has held
that revenue bonds or other indebtedness to be paid
through a self-liquidating program or operation and
not out of tax monies are not within the limitation
(Uni?:ersity of Utah v. Candland, 36 Utah 406, 104
P. 285, 24 L.R.A.; Spence v. Utah State Agricutural
College, 119 Utah 104, 225 P.2d 18). Section 2 of
Article XIV apparently makes a further exception if
the purpose of the contracted indebtedness of the
State is to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or
to defend the State in war.
5
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Having placed a limit on the indebtedness which
could be contracted by the State, the framers of the
Constitution then proceeded in Section 3 to place a
limit upon subordinate levels of local government.
The language used was very broad and would appear to include every level of local government which
at that time was conceivable. The limit applied to
"any county or subdivision thereof, or ... any school
district therein, or . . . any city, town or village, or
any subdivision thereof in this State; . . . " This
general limitation was to prevent any debt in excess
of the taxes for the current year of such particular
political subdivision, unless a greater debt had been
properly approved by a vote of the taxpayers owning
property within the political subdivision. But this
Court has held that the purchase or construction of
public property, when payment therefore is to be
made exclusively from revenues derived from such
property, is exempt from the constitutional limitation by virtue of the special fund doctrine (Utah
Power and Light Company v. Provo City, 94 Utah
203, 74 P. 2d 1191). This Court has further held
that the word "taxes" in the above provision includes
all revenues theoretically collectible even though not
in fact collected (Scott v. Salt Lake County, 58 Utah
25, 196 P. 1022). It has further been held that the
word "taxes" includes all revenues other than taxes,
such as license fees, waterworks income and department fees (Fjelihted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278,
28 P. 2d 1144).
6
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Section 4 of Article XIV serves as a limitation
upon the authority granted in Section 3, at least to
the extent that it places a ceiling upon the extra
indebtedness which may be created through a vote
by the qualified voters who have paid property taxes.
Section 4 thus places a limit upon counties so that
through an election whereby property taxpayers approve additional indebtedness, such additional indebtedness cannot exceed two per centum; cities,
towns, school districts and other municipal corporations are limited to four per centum; and cities of
the first and second class may incur a larger indebtedness through the procedure outlined in Section 3
with a limit of an additional four per centum, and
cities of the third class and towns may incur by the
same procedure an additional indebtedness not to
exceed eight per centum, providing that such additional indebtedness is for the purpose of supplying
such city or town with water, artificial lights or
sewers, and when the works for such supply are
municipally owned and controlled.
In summary, then, counties have a present constitutional limit on their indebtedness of taxes for
the current year plus two per centum of the present
fair market value of the taxable property within the
county; school districts and municipal corporations
(other than cities and towns) have a present constitutional limit on indebtedness of taxes for the
current year plus four per centum of the current
fair market value of the taxable property within
7
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such district or municipal corporation; cities of the
first and second class have a present constitutional
limitation upon indebtedness of taxes for the current year plus eight per centum of the present fair
market value of the taxable property within their
boundaries; and cities of the third class and towns
have a constitutional debt limit of taxes for the
current year plus twelve per centum of the fair
market value of the taxable property within their
boundaries. This, of course, is the maximum indebtedness which can be incurred, assuming that the
proper elections and other procedures .are followed
and assuming that the funds created by the indebtedness are used for the proper purpose. As pointed
out earlier, this Court has held that the limitations
and procedures of Sections 3 and 4 do not apply
when the indebtedness is to be liquidated by funds
or revenue to be derived from the facility which was
constructed or acquired by creating such indebtedness. (It will be noted that Section 4 was amended
in 1910 to add the eight per centum limitation for
cities of the third class and towns.)
In 1932, Article XI, Section 5 of the Constitution of Utah was amended, adding certain provisions
with reference to the powers of cities. Subsection
(d) provides that the power therein conferred upon
. cities included the power:
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the security of any such excess property, or of any
public utility owned by the city, or of the
revenues thereof, or both, including, in the
8
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case of public utility, a franchise stating the
terms upon which, in case of foreclosure, the
purchaser may operate such utility.
In Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321,
28 P.2d 161 (1933), this Court held that Article
XI, Section 5 extended the constitutional debt limitation to permit the is·suance and sale of bonds on
the security of any public utility owned by the city
or on the revenues to be derived from such utility:
The amendment is of equal dignity with
the provisions in article 14, sections 3 and 4.
These provisions must be read and construed
with relation to each other so as to give a
meaning to each. The powers enumerated in
the amendment [Article XI, Section 5 (d) ]
must be given full significance and force as
intending to grant, subject to acceptance or
limitation by charter, or delegation by legislative act, the power to borrow money on the
security of a utility or its income. It is an
addition to the other provision relative to the
limitation of municipal indebtedness.
This Court has also held that the constitutional
debt limitations above discussed did not apply to
Metropolitan Water Districts, since such entities are
special political subdivisions not covered by the constitutional language (Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah
237, 48 P.2d 530). This Court further held that
the constitutional debt limitations did not apply to
water conservancy districts, since they, too, were a
special type of political subdivision not within the
constitutional definition (Patterick v. Carbon Water
Conservancy District, 106 Utah 55, 145 P.2d 503).
9
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In Condor v. University of Utah, 123 Utah 182, 257
P.2d 367, this Court refused to extend the rationale
of the "restricted special fund theory" to State institutions, thereby concluding that the pledge of funds
to be derived from the operation of dormitories to
repay monies borrowed to construct such dormitories
resulted in the creation of a debt which was not
within the constitutional limitation.
It has also been held that special improvement
districts created under Title 17, Chapter 7 (permitting the levying of special taxes to pay for improvements constructed), do not create a debt within the
constitutional debt limitation for counties or municipalities (Pearson v. Salt Lake County, 9 Utah 2d
388, 346 P .2d 155) . It has further been held that
a 50 year contract obligating a city to make payments over that period of time is not an indebtedness
within the constitutional limitation where the monthly or annual payments vary with the amount of
service received pursuant to the contract, and where
the money to make the payments is to be derived
from operating proceeds (Bair v. Layton City Corporation, 6 Utah 2d 138, '307 P.2d 89 5.
In Tygesen v. Magna Water Corporation, 119
Utah 274, 226 P .2d 127, this Court further held
that improvement districts created under Title 17,
Chapter 6, were special arms of the State of Utah
which were not included within the constitutional
debt limitations for counties or municipal corporations, and that legislation authorizing indebtedness
1

1
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in excess of such constitutional limitations was
therefore valid. See, also, Freeman v. Stewart, 2
Utah 2d 319, 273 P.2d 174.
In the instant case the Court now is called upon
to determine whether the debt limitations of the
Constitution are applicable to Service Areas created
under Title 17, Chapter 29, Utah Code Annotated.
It is perhaps advisable to take a brief survey of
what is happening and can happen to the debt limitations placed upon governmental units by the framers of the Constitution and the citizens and tax
payers who adopted it.
The Attorney General cannot quite support the
argument by Appellant (Brief, Page 6) that:
The majority could then declare that the
county or parts thereof constituted any number of districts and thereby create enough
taxing units that the result could be any
amount of indebtedness even up to 100 per
cent. If these constitutional sections are given
effect, the total of authorized indebtedness
of the county and any district therein should
not exceed 2 per cent of [sic (and) ] that of
a town or city of the third class should not
exceed 4 per cent.
The proper debt limitations of counties and
cities are discussed above. Service Areas could not
be formed to authorize an aggregate indebtedness
up to 100 per cent. Section 17-29-5 (as amended) ,
provides in part that:
County service areas may overlap if the
service area which overlaps is entirely within
1:1
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the boundaries of the service area which it
overlaps, provided not more than two (three,
if one is county wide) service areas occupy
the same area in the same county and no
overlapping areas may perform the same
service.
It will thus be observed that the 12 per cent
debt limitation authorized by Section 17-29-21 could
be applied no more than three times, and no more
than twice unless one Service Area encompassed the
entire county. There could thus be a maximum debt
limit under the Service Area Act of 36 per cent of
the reasonable fair cash value of taxable property
so situated as to be included within three separate
Service Areas. While this is not so disturbing as the
100 per cent possible indebtedness claimed by appellant, it is sufficiently substantial as to justify a
careful study. When one considers the possible indebtedness which might be placed against particular
property by its inclusion within school districts, conservancy districts, improvement districts, cemetery
districts, mosquito abatement districts, Service
Areas, and any number of other special political
subdivisions, in addition to the authorized indebtedness which may be incurred by the State, county or
city, it is at once obvious that the aggregate indebtedness might approximate 100 per cent of the f.air
cash value of such property.
This concern was expressed in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Moffat, concurred in by Justice
Ephraim Hanson, in Lehi City v. Meiling, cited
1'2
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snpra, wherein he said at page 289 of the Utah
RPporter:
If constitutional limitations may thus by
a process of definition be eliminated, evaded,
or evaporated out of the Constitution, the
stablizing purposes and restraints of constitutions intended to tide the people over periods
of emergency, excitement, or trouble until
calm reflection may analyze and measure the
needs, will cease to accomplish the purposes
for which they are intended. Constitutions
are drawn during sober hours, upon careful
and painstaking consideration. It is beside
the question to say the framers of the Constitution did not anticipate an offer of large
governmental allowances or bounties for such
beneficial purposes. It is certain, however,
that the framers of the Constitution and the
people who ado'J!ted it intended that certain
fixed debt polictes and limitations should be
maintained.
lt is not contended that the variety of special
political subdivisions whose creation has been authorized by legislation are products of "emergency,
excitement or trouble" as feared by the dissent.
But it is contended that any fair reading of Article
XIV would place debt limitations on every level of
government, whether quasi-municipal or not. The
only authority of the Legislature to authorize or
create indebtedness beyond the specific limitations
of that Article is when the purpose for such debts
is to repel invasion, suppress insurrection or defend
the State in war. It is admitted that it is now too
late in the day to cast clouds upon the various dis1'3
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tricts which have been authorized by legislation,
judicially approved, created locally, taxed locally,
and which have bonded and created indebtedness
beyond apparent constitutional debt limitations.
This Court has consistently said that such entities
are quasi-municipal corporations, distinguishable
from cities or counties or any subdivision thereof,
and thus not within the debt limitations of the Constitution. But it is submitted that the current trend
of judicially validating such entities ought not be
continued ad infinitum without a review by the
people of the meaning and intent of their constitutional, de.bt limitations. Perhaps all of the quasimunicipal agencies so created are beneficial, worthwhile and desired by the people receiving benefits
therefrom. If so, the people should amend Article
XIV of their Constitution either to increase the debt
limitations, or to provide that any specially created
quasi-municipal corporation is exempt from any debt
limitation whatsoever.
Any reasonable reading of the proceedings of
the Constitutional Convention clearly demonstrates
the accuracy of the dissenting opinion in Lehi City
v.Meiling, cited supra, where it was observed that
it was "certain" that the debt limitations were intended to apply to Metropolitan Water Districts.
There was considerable discussion of the debt limitation provisions, and substantial difference of
opinion as to what the provisions should be, but
certainly no question but that the limitations would
14
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apply to all types of state and local government, so
that the aggregate indebtedness could in no circumstance exceed the constitutional authorizations and
limitations.
In the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, Volume I, Page 777, the members of the
Convention seemed to believe that they were as
bright a group as would ever be assembled:
Mr. Buys ... We have a better representation here of this State, of the future
State, than we will ever have in the Legislature. There are more men here and know
just as well what we want as the Legislature
will know, and if this is not what we want let
us make it what we want, but certainly have
some guaranty in this Constitution guaranteeing the citizens of this State against arrest,
and I think it is just what we want as it is,
and I shall certainly vote for it.
Mr. Thurman. I will ask you if you don't
think it is altogether improbable that there
will ever be as bright a lot assembled together
again?
Mr. Buys. Yes, sir; I do.
Pages 781 through 782 of Volume I, proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, make clear
the feeling of the framers of the Utah Constitution
to the effect that there should be strict debt limitations applicable to all levels of local government.
This is further illustrated on Pages 1137-41
of Volume II. Then on Pages 1184 through 1201
of Volume II, which is a report of the debate during
15

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the 47th day on the question of public debt, there
was considerable discussion as to the number of
electors which should be required to authorize indebtedness. In other words, while the constitutional
debt limitation cannot be exceeded by any means,
it cannot even be reached unless the taxpayers authorize contracting indebtedness through the means
of an election called for that purpose. There was
much discussion in favor of requiring a majority of
qualified electors to vote in approval of such debt
as opposed to requiring only a majority of the electors who actually voted. By a close vote, the framers
of the Constitution rejected the proposition that a
majority of qualified electors would have to approve
the debt and simply provided that a majority of
those voting would be sufficient.
After this action, the convention then revised
downward some of the earlier propositions as to
what the debt limitations should be. In particular,
Pages 1188 through 1196 of Volume II show the
general feeling of members of the convention in their
opposition to high debt limitations and their strict
feeling that the public .and taxpayers should be protected against themselves by binding limitations.
Otherwise, the framers were concerned that a current feeling in favor of a new school or a hospital
or a library or some other facility would cause each
successive election to carry, and .a new indebtedness
would be created for each new public facility until
the taxpayers had voted themselves into a position
16
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of hopeless debt. These limitations on public debt
were intended to prevent the public from voting
themselves into that type of situation.
It is difficult to perceive any limit to the variety
of services that could be provided by Service Areas
created under Title 17, Chapter 29. Such services
may include, but are not limited to, police protection, structural fire protection, culinary or irrigation water retail service, water conservation, park
and recreation and parkway facilities and services,
cemeteries, public libraries, sewers, sewage and
storm water treatment and disposal, flood control,
garbage and refuse collection, street lighting, airports, planning and zoning, streets and roads, curb
and gutter and sidewalk construction and maintenance, mosquito abatement, health department services and hospital services. The above services are
specifically authorized by Section 17-2'9-3, which section also provides that such services and facilities
are hy no means exclusive, and that Service Areas
may provide other services not limited to those enumerated. It is difficult to see where the ends and
limits of Service Areas are. It raises a sobering question in view of the strict constitutional debt limitations-at what point, if ever, should a judicial rein be
placed upon the Legislature? Or should there he an
unlimited number of districts or areas to perform
any conceivable service or function, with no debt limitation, save that which may be provided from time
to time by the Legislature?
17
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Should not this Court place a judicial limitation upon at least the nature of those entities which
may be created to operate free and clear of constitutional debt limitations? In this regard, it is suggested that only those entities which perform essential governmental purposes should be so recognized.
Perhaps the Court should conclude that a Service
Area created to perform a hospital service is a
constitutional entity because such service is a vital
governmental service, of critical importance to the
welfare of the citizens within the area. It is questionable whether the same result should obtain if the
Service Area were created for an elaborate recreational faciliity as authorized by the act.
The position of the Attorney General is not to
seek a reversal of the lower court, nor to urge the
Court to declare the instant Service Area to be an
unconstitutional entity. It is believed that this Court
should sustain Chapter 29, Title 17 so far as it authorizes Service Areas to perform hospital functions.
But it is believed that the Court should use cautious
language with respect to the other types of Service
Areas that might conceivably be created within the
broad language of the statute. There is always a
danger in friendly lawsuits which seek a hurried
judicial whitewashing of statutes so that entities
created thereunder can procure immediate financing
to proceed with some contemplated facility. The
urge of the Attorney General upon this Court is
simply that a comprehensive view be taken of the
18
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nature and extent to which quasi-municipal corporations are being formed, and the almost unlimited
debt that can accumulate against the property of a
taxpayer who may or may not favor such debt. Perhaps the time has come to afford some protection to
such taxpayers, even against themselves, at least
until such time as the people of the State of Ut~h
have an opportunity to review the debt limitations
of Article XIV of their Constitution and determine
whether or not such limitations on governmental
agencies shall be meaningful or meaningless.
B. Service Areas are not special commissions.
Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah Constitution
provides that;
The legislature shall not delegate to any
special commission, private corporation or
association, any power to make, supervise or
interfere with any municipal improvement,
money, property or effects, whether held in
trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a
capitol site, or to perform any municipal functions.
It is believed that Service Areas do not violate
the prohibition of the above section of the Constitution. The Service Area Act is not a delegation of
anything to anyone, but is simply permissive legislation which allows certain things to be performed by
local government. It is clear that the board of county
commissioners of any particular county may initiate
the formation of a Service Area, but the Service
Area is locally formed, locally controlled, locally
19

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

operated and locally taxed.
It is true that cities of the third class and towns
may be included in a Service Area, but cities of the
first and second class cannot. Therefore, the only
possible conflict would be if a Service Area performed municipal functions which otherwise should
and could have been performed by cities of the third
class or towns which were included within the Service Area. But in this regard, it will be observed
that such cities or towns are authorized to have representation on the governing board of the Service
Area, .and if any such city or town were performing
the same municipal function which the Service Area
sought to perform, then the city or town could be excluded from the Service Area because it would not be
benefited by receiving a duplication of services
already rendered by the munici pality.
Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah '2d 412,
375 P.2d 756 (1962), which invalidated the Civic
Auditorium and Sports Arena Act of 1961, is distinguishable from the present case. In the Backman
case the Court found that the act created a special
commission and empowered it to interfere with a
municipal function, and, further, that the act was
arb]trary in that it was designed to apply to Salt
Lake County only. It is submitted that the Backman decision was sound, but simply is not applicable
to a Service Area. It must be recognized that the
services authorized by Section 17-29-3 are, in the
main, legitimate areas justifying police power legis20
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lation (particularly when such legislation simply
authorizes localities to create such entities and then
establish their own governing boards).
The explanation by Justice Wolfe in Lehi City
v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 84 P.2d 530, though a
special concurring opinion, succinctly discusses authorization by the Legislature for the creation of
units of local government to perform certain functions which might conceivably have been performed
by municipalities, had they been financia'lly able:
That is not the same as saying that an
entity could not be formed to do that which
the city could not do because of the magnitude
or character of the project or because it was
such a project which must necessarily serve
more than one city. Thus, if an agency were
constituted to aid and not to interfere with the
performance of a municipal function, the case
might well be different. An illustration is at
hand in the very case under consideration.
Any one of the cities or towns, perhaps all of
them, included in the water district sought to
be formed, cannot perhaps undertake to carry
through a project of the magnitude which the
Legislature had in mind when this act was
passed. It may even require the combined resources of several of these water districts, and
extraneous financial aid, to accomplish it. Yet
the end to be accomplished, to wit, furnishing
the inhabitants of each city or town with
water, is in itself a municipal function. But
the building of an immense project to serve
many cities is in itself of a magnitude and
character as to take it out of the category of
municipal functioning. It is certainly not the
21
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ordinary function of a municipali ty in this
state to construct immense engineering projects for the bringing of water from long distances. A "municipal function" is that which
municipalities ordinarily do, or are capable of
doing, or which they may by the Legislature
be permitted to do. Supplying water to its
inhabitants and building appropriate waterworks to do this is a municipal function. Engaging in some vast engineering project far
beyond its financial powers, and perhaps its
legal powers, but ultimately designed to supply its inhabitants, together with inhabitants
of other cities, with water may be something
more than a municipal function. If the building of the Boulder Dam was necessary to give
the city of Los Angeles a water supply, it
might still be a national rather than a municipal function, not only on account of the legal
complications due to its interstate nature, but
because of the magnitude of the project being
such as to be beyond the capabilities of even a
city of that size, or even of a state.
A final note with reference to the Service Areacounty relationship compels the observation that Service Areas are designed to be very closely connected
with the county level of government. The board of
county commissioners can make a determination
that a Service Area is needed and proceed to establish the 'Same [Section 17-'2'9-4 ·( 11) ] . The Legislature
has declared that a Service Area shall be deemed "a
body corporate and politic and a quasi-municipal
public corporation.... " (Section 17-29-10.2). But
the board of trustees of the Service Area can utilize
"any existing county offices, officers or employees
22
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for purposes of the service area when in the opinion
of the board of trustees it is advisable to do so.... "
[Section 17-29-10.2 (7) ]. Apparently the Board of
County Commissioners has nothing to say about the
use of its officers or facilities by the Service Area;
but, on the other hand, the Board of County Commissioners has the exclusive say as to how much
money it shall take from Service Area funds, and the
Service Area has nothing to say about the amount so
taken by the county (Section 17-29-15). About the
only limitation is the implied concept that everyone
¥.1.11 be reasonable about the whole thing. One cannot
help but wonder, however, whether a county wide
Service Area would not be, in effect, the alter ego
of the county. This not only casts shadows as to the
type of entity the Service Area is, but it further
shows the thin veil used to escape the constitutional
debt limitations applicable to counties (and as discussed under Point A, supra).
C. Service Areas perform essential governmental services.
Much uncertainty exists with respect to whether
governmental immunity is a defense to tort claims
asserted against the variety of quasi-municipal corporations organized pursuant to laws similar to the
Service Area Act. This Court has applied a test as
to whether a particular function of a government
subdivision is proprietary or governmental, permitting suit in former but denying it in the latter.
As recently as April27, 1964 this Court handed
23

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

down its opinion in Gordon v. Provo City Corporation, Case No. 9992, in which the city was held
liable for injury sustained by the plaintiff arising
out of the operation of a municipal water system.
Liability was based upon the observation that the
water system was a commercial venture engaged in
by the city in a proprietary capacity. In so holding,
the Court followed earlier Utah Cases, such as
Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570 and
Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253 P. 443.
The distinction of proprietary versus governmental is not ordinarily applied to the State of Utah
or its agencies, such as the Department of Highways
or the Department of Fish and Game. It is unclear
to what extent the distinction would be applied to
counties or to governmental public corporations such
as metropolitan water districts, improvement districts or Service Areas. The language in Lund v.
Salt Lake County, 58 Utah 546, 200 P. 510, suggests
that the distinction may be applied to counties. In
that case Salt Lake County was engaged in an operation whereby it supplied water for rental to certain
persons, .and the Court concluded that such a practice was ultra vires because the county was not
authorized to engage in the water business. The
Court therefore refused to apply the governmental
v. proprietary test, saying that such a test would be
moot since the act or practice was ultra vires :
If they (Salt Lake County) were organized to engage in such business, as was Salt
Lake City in the Brown case, cited by plain24
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tiff, we see no objection to applying the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, and
holding the municipality liable. On the other
hand, if they are entirely without authorization to engage in private business we do not
understand upon what principle they could be
held liable, whether the business was profitable or not...
Prior to disposing of the case by holding that
the water business was an ultra vires act of the
county, the Court indicated its approval of the theory
that the doctrine of respondeat superior would apply
to make the county liable for negligent acts of its
employees when performing a proprietary service,
and a great many authorities are cited on Page 560
of the Utah Reporter to justify such a holding. But
on Page 562 the Court seemed unsure as to whether
the county in fact should be liable if the revenue
derived from a proprietary function was incidental
rather than substantial:
Even if such condition existed (existence
of the power by the county to engage in the
water business), and the power so exercised,
the revenue derived therefrom would be purely incidental. In such circumstances we know
of no reason why plaintiff's right to recover
damages should be different from what it is
in the case as it now stands. (citing cases)
So it is unclear as to what the dictum of the
Lund case really says. It suggests that the governmental versus proprietary distinction should apply
to counties, but at the same time suggests that if the
proprietary function is only incidentally profitable
25
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rather than substantially profitable, even a proprietary function will be protected by governmental
immunity. This would mean that only those proprietary functions yielding a substantial profit to
the county would be truly proprietary in the sense
that governmental immunity would not be a defense.
Compare Davis vs. Provo City Corporation, 1 Utah
2d 244, 265 P.2d 415.
The Federal Government, as a government of
delegated power only, has been recognized as being
able to perform only governmental functions and
without power or authority to exercise proprietary
functions (although the United States has consented
to suit in certain areas). This is so because all
powers of the Federal Government are those expressly granted by the Federal Constitution or those
powers necessarily implied from powers expressly
granted. As such, the Federal Government can only
act in a governmental capacity. Anything beyond
that would be an ultra vires act. The State of Utah
is a government having a residuum of governmental
power, and in this regard is more comparable to a
municipality ("home rule" city) than it is to the
Federal Government. Despite this, the State of Utah
and its agencies have been held to act in only a
governmental capacity, while municipalities (and
perhaps counties) are considered to act in proprietary as well as governmental capacities.
This raises the question as to whether quasimunicipal corporations, such as Service Areas, act
26
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only in governmental capacities or whether they
also act in proprietary capacities. The possibility of
anomalous results has .already been suggested by this
Court. This can be illustrated by examining two
cases. In Cobia v. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 366
P.2d 986 this Court said that the operation of a
sewer is a governmental function:
It seems to us that the operation of a
sewer more nearly is governmentally charged
than are most or all of those situations we
have reviewed, as reflected in the cases just
mentioned. To exclude the operation of sewers
from this field reasonably would seem unjustifiable in logic or otherwise. To do so
would do violence to our concept of separation
of powers, we believe. We have left to the
Constitution and legislature the matter of
waiver of immunity in such cases.
But in Gordon v. Provo City Corporation, cited
supra, the Court unhesitatingly reaffirmed earlier
cases concluding that the operation of a water system was a proprietary function wherein governmental immunity could not serve as a defense. Thus,
the Cobia case and the Gordon case clearly set forth
the rule tbat a 'sewer system is a governmental function but a water system is a proprietary function, at
least so far as municipal operations are concerned.
Consider the problems that such holdings pose. Title
17, Chapter 6, Utah Code, provides for the creation
of improvement districts for the operation of water
or sewage systems. A district authorized under that
chapter could be for either purpose, and the method
27
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of creating and operating such a district would be
the same without regard to whether the district was
organized for the purpose of operating a water or a
sewer system. In either instance revenues would be
derived both from the sale of the service and from
taxation, and in neither case could the district operate for a profit. Would this Court hold that an improvement district authorized for the purposes of
operating a sewage system operates in a governmental capacity, while another improvement district
authorized in an identical manner under the very
same chapter but for the purpose of operating a
water system would be a proprietary creature, having no governmental immunity at all. The Court
would have to so hold if it followed the municipal
corporation distinction applied in the Cobia and
Gordon cases, but if the Court applied a different
test because improvement districts are quasi-municipal corporations, then both water and sewage distriets might be treated the same.
This problem assumes considerable importance.
Should Service Areas procure liability insurance
policies to protect against tort claims? They should
if their functions are proprietary, but they should
not if their functions are governmental. But if
liability insurance is obtained and the function is
governmental, then the payment of the premium for
such insurance would be "a waste of taxpayers'
money" as observed by the Court in the Cobia case,
and would perhaps be an illegal,expenditure of pub28
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lie funds as ruled by the Attorney General in a
number of opinions (Opinion Nos. 54-022, 54-035,
54-004, 53-127 and 54-058, Biennial Report of the
Attorney General, June 30, 1954).

On the other hand, if the Service Area does not
wish to waste taxpayers' money, nor to make an
illegal expenditure of public funds, and so refrains
from securing liability insurance on the assumption
that its conduct is governmental, and then finds,
when a substantial tort claims is asserted, that its
function is in fact proprietary, it is too late to obtain
insurance, and the service area may find itself in a
position where it is unable to pay a substantial judgment.
It is significant to note that the Legislature has
concerned itself, and is presently concerning itself,
with a means of legislatively permitting some recovery against governmental units by tort claimants.
A tort claims act was passed in 1961 but was vetoed
by the Governor. In 1963 the Legislature in H.J.R.
No. 21 resolved that the Legislative Council:
... investigate and study the effects upon
the state and its political subdivisions of
immunity from suit and consent to be liable
for the torts of their officers, employees and
agents, together with the most workable
statutes and procedures for carrying out such
legislation and to make recommendations to
the 36th Legislature. (Laws of Utah 1963,
Page 685)
In order to finance this study, the Legislature
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appropriated to the Legislative Council the sum of
$25,000 (Item 4, Section 13, Chapter 198, Laws of
Utah 1963) . While it is not clear when or under
what circumstances the Legislature will provide for
tort claimants to realize a recovery against the State
or its political subdivisions, it is clear that the
Legislature is vitally concerned with the problem and
is working diligently toward a practical solution.
Since the Court has repeatedly observed that this
problem is a legislative one to be solved by the Legislature, this Court should give a broad application
to governmental immunity until such time as a tort
claims act is passed. It is likely that such legislation
will include metropolitan water districts, improvement districts, Service Areas and related entities,
and those entities should therefore be considered to
be governmental in nature and to have the defense
of governmental immunity until such time as the
Legislature enacts tort claims legislation.
It is realized that no specific issue is presented
on appeal relating to the question of governmental
immunity. But this Court is called upon to speak
for the first time concerning the nature of the entities created as Service Areas under the Service
Area Act, and this Court should have in mind the
application of any language used in describing Service Areas. It is submitted that if this Court holds
that the only quasi-municipal corporations which can
be created to operate free and clear of the constitutional debt limitations are those which perform
30
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essential governmental functions, then it is both
reasonable and proper to assume that such quasimunicipal corporations enjoy governmental immunity from tort suits. This would serve as a guide
to such subdivisions of government in determining
whether public liability policies should be secured.
This would also 'be consistent with the Legislature's
declaration in Section 17-29-26 to the effect that
Service Areas perform "essential governmental
functions."
CONCLUSION
The Attorney General has appeared in this appeal pursuant to Section 78-33-11, not in support of
the appellant or the respondent, but in support of
the taxpayers in general throughout the State of
Utah as well as in support of quasi-municipal corporations of various designations which have been
created and are operating under a variety of
statutes. It is believed that the time is now ripe for
this Court to carefully consider the nature and extent to which quasi-municipal corporations can be
created to contract indebtedness free and clear of
any const:iutional limitations. As the various statutes authorizing the organization of quasi-municipal corporations have been presented to the Court,
the Court has followed a step-by-step pattern of validating these entities. If when the first such case had
been presented to this Court, it would have been
foreseeable that such a great number of similar entities would later be authorized by the Legislature,
31
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it is likely that the Court earlier would have suggested some limitations. But at this point we are a
long way down the road, and even with the benefit
of hindsight to guide foresight, it is not possible to
foresee how many new but similar entities will yet
be authorized by the Legislature. In order not to
disturb prior decisions of this Court, and yet to give
some sober protection to taxpayers and the public in
general, it is submitted that this Court should rule
that the only quasi-municipal corporations which
may be created are those that perform essential
governmental purposes which cannot reasonably be
performed by an existing level of government in the
particular area.
This language would suggest to the Legislature
that there are limits to which quasi-municipal corporations can be created, and it would further suggest to such existing entities that they perform services as a governmental function and are immune
from tort liability until the Legislature enacts some
specific legislation with reference to tort claims,
thus, for the present, guiding such political subdivisions in their decision whether to insure or not to
insure against tort liability claims.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
RICHARD L. DEWSNUP
Assistant Attorney General
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